Bank lending in uncertain times by Alessandri, P. & Bottero, M.
▪ Birkbeck, University of London ▪ Malet Street ▪ London ▪ WC1E 7HX ▪ 
ISSN 1745-8587 
 
 
 
 
BCAM 1703 
 
 
Bank lending in uncertain times 
 
 
 
Piergiorgio Alessandri 
Banca d’Italia 
 
 
Margherita Bottero 
Banca d’Italia 
 
 
 
February 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
B
ir
k
b
e
c
k
 C
e
n
tr
e
 f
o
r 
A
p
p
li
e
d
 M
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 
Bank lending in uncertain times
Piergiorgio Alessandri Margherita Botteroy
December 5, 2016
Abstract
We study the impact of economic uncertainty on the supply of bank credit using a
monthly dataset that includes all loan applications submitted by a sample of 650,000 Italian
rms between 2003 and 2012. We nd that an increase in aggregate uncertainty has three
e¤ects. First, it reduces banks likelihood to accept new credit applications. Second, it
lengthens the time rms have to wait for their loans to be released. Third, it makes banks
less responsive to uctuations in short-term interest rates, weakening the bank lending
channel of monetary policy. The inuence of uncertainty is relatively stronger for poorly
capitalized lenders and geographically distant borrowers.
Keywords: uncertainty, credit supply, bank lending channel, loan applications.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Economic crises generate uncertainty but they also feed on it. As the prolonged recessions
that followed the nancial crises of 2008-2012 demonstrate, economic volatility brings about a
widespread reluctance to borrow, lend and invest that can signicantly slow down the recovery.1
The relation between uncertainty, credit and investment is complex because uncertainty can act
through both the demand and the supply side of credit markets. If their choices are irreversible,
rms may choose to invest and borrow less when uncertainty is high (Bernanke, 1983; Bloom,
2009; Bloom et al., 2012). Yet creditors face the same problem: corporate loans  their own
investments are risky and irreversible too, and they clearly become less attractive when rms
prospects grow more uncertain (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al.,
2014). This raises a natural question: is the slow-down in bank lending observed in uncertain
timesa pure by-product of the rmsown choices, or does it also reveal a nancial acceleration
e¤ect, as increasingly hesitant lenders force rms to borrow less than they would like to? If this
is the case, which rms end up bearing the costs of such a shift in bankslending strategies?
In this article we answer these questions by exploiting the microeconomic data available from
the Credit Register of the Bank of Italy. We construct a loan-level dataset that tracks at a
monthly frequency the outcome of all new loan applications submitted by a sample of 650,000
nonnancial rms between 2003 and 2012 and combine it with bank and rm balance sheet data.
We then examine the impact of various measures of aggregate uncertainty on (i) the probability
that rmsapplications get approved and (ii) the time rms have to wait to receive their loans
conditional on being successful. Approval probabilities are a measure of the extensive margin
of credit supply that has been widely exploited in the banking literature to disentangle supply
from demand dynamics, while delays in banks credit granting decisions are studied here for
the rst time. We also study the relation between uncertainty and the bank lending channel
of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). The motivation is
straightforward. Nonnancial rms are known to respond less to changes in fundamentals when
uncertainty is high (Guiso and Parigi, 1999; Bloom et al., 2007). Banks might in principle be
subject to a similar wait-and-see type of behavior, and if this is the case their response to shifts
in monetary policy might be muted when uncertainty is high.
The identication of a genuine inuence of uncertainty on the supply of bank credit faces a
number of complications. Credit demand may change heterogeneously across rms in response to
uncertainty shocks, depending inter alia on the rmsnancial constraints (Alfaro et al., 2016).
1The research on the topic is reviewed below. For the policy side of the debate, see FOMC (2008), Blanchard
(2009), Buti and Padoan (2013).
2
The quality of the potential borrowers may worsen in bad times, giving banks an independent
reason to be less accommodating (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). Furthermore, uncertainty may
propagate di¤erently depending on the banksbusiness models, including the strength of their
existing relationships (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Bolton et al., 2016). We get around these problems
by combining two simple ideas. The rst one is to exploit the granularity of the dataset, and the
fact that rms typically apply for funds to a number of di¤erent banks at once, to introduce in the
regressions time-varying xed e¤ects that vary at the rm level, thus controlling for changes in
observed and unobserved rm characteristics as well as general business cycle conditions (Gan,
2007; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Jimenéz et al. 2012, 2014). The second one is to focus on
bank capital as the key source of heterogeneity in the intermediariesbehavior, while controlling
extensively for other bank characteristics. With frictional capital markets, leverage constraints
increase the value of banksequity rendering them e¤ectively more risk averse (Froot et al. 1993,
Froot and Stein, 1998). Banksnet worth is indeed likely to be a key driver of their response
to changes in the level of aggregate risk in the economy (Brunnermeier et al., 2012, Adrian
and Shin, 2014). It follows that, if uncertainty matters at all, it must matter more for thinly
capitalized lenders. Once combined, these modelling choices ultimately lead us to analyze the
impact of uncertainty on the applications submitted by a given rm at a given point in time
to banks that di¤er in their capital bu¤ers, and hence in their willingness and capacity to bear
additional aggregate risk.
We have three main ndings. First, a rise in aggregate uncertainty reduces the approval rate
for rmsloan applications: a one standard deviation increase in the Economic Policy Uncertainty
index of Baker et al. (2015), for instance, causes a drop in rmsapproval probability from 21
to about 19 per cent. Second, even successful rms must wait longer for their loans to be
released when uncertainty is high. Interestingly, interest rates do not have this e¤ect: the
length of a banks decision-making process appears to be a¤ected by its condence about the
future but not by monetary policy in and by itself. Third, uncertainty weakens the bank lending
channel of monetary policy. These mechanisms are quantitatively signicant: the direct e¤ects of
uncertainty are comparable to those of monetary policy itself, and the interaction between the two
is such that the bank lending channel essentially disappears in very volatile environments. They
also display interesting cross-sectional patterns. Besides operating more through less capitalized
banks, uncertainty has a stronger impact on rms that are geographically distant from the bank
to which they place their applications. From a rms perspective, physical proximity turns out
to be a better hedge against uncertainty shocks than a good credit rating.
Our main contribution to the literature is to leverage on high-quality microeconomic data to
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study the causal link between uncertainty and credit supply. Our dataset allows us to track both
approved and rejected loan applications, rather than focusing on changes in credit ows observed
ex-post, and to study within-rm outcomes, checking how applications placed simultaneously by
the same rm are treated by banks with di¤erent capital ratios (and hence a di¤erent appetite for
bearing aggregate risk). This makes it possible to move from a somewhat speculative interpreta-
tion of the patterns in the data to a more stringent discourse on causality. In this process we also
highlight a dimension of bankslending policies that as far as we know has not been examined
in the banking literature thus far, namely the banksspeed in processing loan applications. This
timing dimension sheds more light on the overall implications of uncertainty, and also on the pe-
culiarity that sets uncertainty aside from other factors that also a¤ect bank decisions, including
monetary policy. A third complementary contribution we o¤er to the literature is a thorough
investigation of the interaction between uncertainty and the traditional bank lending channel of
monetary policy. Economic uncertainty might in principle matter because of its inuence on the
transmission of monetary shocks, as well as its direct negative e¤ect on credit supply, and this
possibility has been largely overlooked thus far.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant
literature. Section 3 introduces our dataset and presents a set of stylized facts on the behavior
of credit applications and approvals in Italy between 2003 and 2012. We then move to the
econometric analysis. We begin by studying the dynamics of the loan approval rate, which
provides a direct link between our work and existing studies of the transmission of monetary
policy based on loan-level data (e.g. Jiménez et al., 2012, 2014). Section 4 presents our key
results as well as a set of robustness tests. In Section 5 we switch from the probability of
approval to the second dimension of interest, namely the timing of the banksdecisions. Section
6 discusses further identication and robustness issues and Section 7 concludes. The annex to
the paper provides additional estimation results and background material.
2 Related literature
Uncertainty rises sharply in or ahead of economic slowdowns (Bloom, 2014). Risk-aversion
naturally pushes consumers to save more in riskier environments, causing a decline in economic
activity (Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 2011). This basic precautionary
motive can be reinforced by two types of mechanisms.2 The rst one relates to technology: with
non-convex capital adjustments costs, a rise in volatility pushes rms to postpone investment
2We limit our discussions to frameworks where risk a¤ects the economic cycle, but causality could in principle
run in the opposite direction see e.g. Bachmann and Moscarini (2012).
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and hiring decisions because it increases the likelihood that these will have to be reversed in the
future (Bernanke (1983), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2012)). The second one relates to nancial
markets: a rise in uncertainty increases rmsdefault probabilities and benets equity holders
at the expense of debt holders, and this in turn causes an increase in credit spreads, which must
rise to compensate creditors for bearing more risk (Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014;
Gilchrist et al., 2014).
These theories place di¤erent frictions at the centre of the transmission mechanism and lead
to opposite conclusions as to which side of the credit market is a¤ected the most by uncertainty.
In the real viewuncertainty translates into a shock to the demand for credit. In the nancial
view, on the other hand, uncertainty shifts the supply curve by making lenders ceteris paribus
less willing to provide whatever funds rms may require. Importantly, the frictions that underpin
the nancial view can also a¤ect the demand side of the credit market. Alfaro, Bloom and Lin
(2016) and Chen (2016) show that nancially-constrained rms are more sensitive to uncertainty.3
The impact of credit constraints on rm behavior appears to be quantitatively relevant both in
the USA (Alfaro et al., 2016; Chen, 2016) and in other advanced economies (Choi et al., 2016).
These results suggest that the identication problem posed by the tension between real and
nancial view is a particularly hard one to solve. Identifying a genuine credit supply e¤ect on
the basis of aggregate, sectoral or even bank-level data is essentially impossible: at those levels
of aggregation one cannot credibly rule out the possibility that the contraction in credit that
follows a rise in uncertainty is caused by the choices of the borrowers rather than those of the
lenders.
Microeconometric studies of uncertainty have mostly focused on nonnancial rms and on
idiosyncratic rather than aggregate uncertainty measures. Leahy and Whited (1996) and Bloom
et al. (2007) document a strong relationship between stock price volatility and investment for
manufacturing rms listed respectively in the USA and in the UK. Guiso and Parigi (1999)
measure subjective uncertainty using the distribution of the rmsown expectations on future
demand, and nd this to have a negative impact on investment. The evidence on the relation
between uncertainty and bank lending is more recent and, crucially, it relies to date on aggregate
or bank-level data only. Using consolidated data from the Call Reports, Baum et al. (2013) nd
that the evidence in support of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in the US becomes
weaker after controlling for the volatility of the yields on one-year or ve-year Treasury Bills, a
3If external nancing is costly, these rms have a precautionary motive to reduce their debt and hoard cash in
an uncertain environment, and this pushes them to scale down their investment more than unconstrained rms
when uncertainty is high.
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measure of nancial risk. Valencia (2013) and Bordo et al. (2016) investigate the relation between
the growth of bank lending and various measures of aggregate uncertainty for the USA (including
disagreement among forecasters, stock price volatility and the Economic Policy Uncertainty index
by Baker et al., 2015), showing that uncertainty appears to discourage lending particularly for
relatively less capitalized or illiquid banks, which provides indirect evidence of a causal impact
of uncertainty on bankslending policies. Raunig et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion using
an event study approach which focuses on lending dynamics around four uncertainty episodes,
including the start of the Iraq war in 1990 or September 11th 2001. Alessandri and Panetta (2015)
document that an increase in economic policy uncertainty predicts a tightening in the lending
standards reported by European banks, as measured by the ECBs Bank Lending Survey. Gissler
et al. (2016) introduce a specic measure of regulatory uncertainty exploiting the delays that
occurred during the legislative process aimed at dening the new requirements for qualied
mortgages in the US, and show that this correlates negatively with mortgage lending by US
banks. Valencia (2016) documents a positive cross-sectional relation between the variance of
banksreturns or capital bu¤ers and their future capital ratios, consistent with the emergence of
a self-insurance motive.
We share with some of these works the premise that bank capital is important to identify
uncertainty e¤ects. Since borrowing constraints e¤ectively increase their risk aversion, weakly
capitalized banks are likely to be not only less willing to lend, as known, but also more responsive
to changes in the level of non-diversiable risk in the economy. In other words, they should
respond more to aggregate uncertainty shocks.4 Our rst contribution to the literature is to
leverage on high-quality microeconomic data to test this possibility in a more stringent way
than has hitherto been done. By studying within-rm outcomes, we can check how banks that
di¤er in their capital bu¤ers (and hence in their capacity to bear aggregate risk) treat credit
applications submitted by the same rm at the same point in time, thus excluding a number
of alternative mechanisms that might in principle generate analogous patterns in bank balance
sheets or aggregate credit ows. In pursuing this avenue, we draw on the extensive empirical
banking literature that has exploited loan applications and rejections to isolate credit supply
from demand, using either o¢ cial credit register data (Jimenéz et al., 2012; Albertazzi et al.,
2016; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette, 2016; Ippolito et al., 2016) or private banksdataset (Puri
et al., 2011; Einav et al., 2012; DellAriccia et al., 2012). In particular, we adapt the xed
e¤ect saturation approach of Jimenéz et al. (2012, 2014) to study the heterogeneous impact of
4The relation between borrowing constraints, leverage and risk aversion is examined in Froot et al. (1993),
Froot and Stein (1998) and more recently Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). Rampini et al. (2016) demontrate
that equity also a¤ects banks risk management strategies and that well-capitalized banks are relatively more
likely to hedge interest rate risk.
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uncertainty across banks and rms. Our second contribution is to shed light on a dimension
of bank lending  i.e. the time banks take to issue loans to their new borrowers  that has
thus far been overlooked in the literature. Finally, we provide a rst systematic analysis of how
uncertainty and monetary policy interact in shaping bankslending strategies.
3 The data
Our dataset combines various types of information. At the macro level, we use indicators of
aggregate uncertainty, monetary policy and economic activity. At the micro level, we combine
monthly loan-level observations on rmscredit applications with data on bank and rm balance
sheets. We provide a brief description of the uncertainty indicators in Section 3.1 and discuss
in detail the loan-level data in Section 3.2. More information on the remaining series and data
construction details are provided in the Data annex. Throughout the analysis we follow Jimenez
et al. (2014) in using the EONIA rate to capture the monetary policy stance. Using the one-
month Euribor rate does not alter the results (see section 6). Importantly, no unconventional
interventions took place in the euro area over our sample period, which runs from August 2003
to December 2012.
3.1 Uncertainty indicators
Our preferred indicator of aggregate uncertainty is the European Economic Policy Uncertainty
index (hereafter EPU) constructed by Baker et al. (2015). The index is calculated counting the
occurrences of uncertainty- and policy-related keywords in a set of daily European newspapers,
and it aims to capture the uncertainty that surrounds monetary, scal and regulatory policy
interventions in Europe. Policy and regulatory uncertainty are likely to be an important driver
of bank lending strategies (Gissler et al. 2016). More generally, the EPU index has gained
signicant attention since its launch in 2012 and it has been used in a wide range of applied
micro and macroeconomic empirical works on uncertainty.5
5A list of studies based on EPU indices maintained by the authors is available at
http://www.policyuncertainty.com. The European EPU index combines information from ten newspapers,
two for each of ve countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain). The Italian component of the
index is also available separately, and our key results hold if uncertainty is measured with this indicator (see
Section 4.1). Our choice to focus on the European index is based on three considerations. First, the Italian
index is noisier: it is calculated using two papers only (Corriere Della Sera and La Repubblica), so it is more
heavily a¤ected by the idiosyncratic choices of a relatively small group of columnists and editors. Second, the
key monetary, regulatory and scal policy debates that took place in 2002-2012 clearly had a strong international
dimension. Third, three quarters of total banking assets in Italy are held by banks with branches or subsidiaries
abroad (Caccavaio et al., 2014), and these are likely to respond to uncertainty around the European rather than
just the Italian outlook.
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Since there is no commonly accepted way of measuring aggregate uncertainty, and most
proxies are likely to be subject to measurement error, we consider for robustness a number of in-
dicators that di¤er from EPU in terms of both conceptual grounding and empirical construction.
The rst one is the monthly average of the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), which
measures the option-implied volatility on the Euro STOXX 50 equity price index over a 30 days
horizon. Like VIX in the US, VSTOXX is a fearindex that provides a market-based gauge of
the volatility perceived by investors in the European stock market. The index is widely used as
a proxy of aggregate risk perceptions in the euro area and it features regularly in o¢ cial pub-
lications by the European Central Bank (see e.g. ECB Financial Stability Review, May 2014).
A second alternative is disagreement, dened as the cross-sectional standard deviations of the
forecasts issued by the professional forecasters surveyed by Consensus Economics R. We employ
two disagreement indicators that are constructed using respectively forecasts on consumer price
ination and on the government budget balance in the euro zone.6 As these choices make clear,
our analysis focuses on the implications of aggregate rather than idiosyncratic uncertainty: the
indicators are meant to pick up sources of uncertainty that relate to the overall state of economy
and that might in principle a¤ect all banks and rms at once, though not necessarily in the same
way or to the same degree. The proxies we use might reect both the level of actual risk in the
economy and the agentssubjective or Knightian uncertainty about it. The di¤erence between
risk and uncertainty is conceptually interesting, but we do not see it as central to our work.
Figure 1 displays the behavior of the two EPU indices over our sample period. For comparison
we also report VSTOXX. All indicators identify the rst half of the sample as a relatively calm
period: the end of the 2003 recession is followed by ve years of mild and stable uncertainty.
The Lehman crisis marks a clear regime shift. After 2008 uncertainty peaks again during the
sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011. The European EPU index is generally more persistent
than VSTOXX and it reaches its historical maximum in 2011. The Italian version of the index
follows a broadly similar pattern but it appears to be somewhat noisier, possibly on account of
the smaller set of newspapers included in the calculation.
3.2 Loan applications and time to approval: stylized facts
We collect from the Italian Credit Register monthly information on all new loan applications
advanced by a sample of 650.000 non-nancial rms to Italian banks over the period between
6Ination forecasts are useful because they summarize a large number of aggregate demand- and supply-side
factors. The scal balance took center stage in the debate from the onset of the sovereign crisis. Ilut and Schneider
(2014) use a disagreement indicator to estimate a general equilibrium model where Knightian uncertainty is a
powerful driver of the business cycle.
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August 2003 and December 2012. The sample includes rms from the manufacturing, industry,
services and construction sector and it is broadly representative of the entire universe of capital
companies. We only observe the applications placed to banks with which the borrower has no
outstanding credit relation. As standard in the literature, we assign to each loan application a
binary outcome (approvedor rejected) by inspecting whether, in the three months following
its placement, the Credit Register records an increase in the credit granted to the enquiring rm
by the bank that received the application. Of the almost 3 million of applications we observe,
2.3 were rejected, delivering an average approval rate of about 21%.
An overview of the behavior of applications and rejections over time is provided in Figures
2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the total number of applications along with the average number of
applications per rm between 2003 and 2012. The latter is calculated by averaging over active
rms, namely rms that submit at least one application in the month under examination, and
gives an idea of the breadth and intensity of their loan search process.7 The grey bars mark the
two recessions that hit Italy over the sample period, as dated by the OECD. The main fact that
stands out from the chart is the steady decline in applications from 2008 onwards, both at the
aggregate and individual rm level. This is a clear sign that demand is an important driver of the
patterns in the data. More specically, the regression analysis must confront the possibility of a
signicant drop in demand after the Lehman crisis. A second interesting fact is that the number
of applications does not systematically fall during recessions: both in 2009 and in 2011 there
are distinct phases when the applications actually increase, albeit only temporarily. This raises
interesting questions on the nature and motivations of the applicants: it might be for instance
that recessions bring about lemon marketswhere (otherwise inactive) bad borrowers crowd out
good borrowers; or that, irrespective of their quality, rms shop around more in bad times to
minimize the risk of ending up without loans. Our identication strategy, which relies on within-
rm heterogeneity in the applicationsoutcomes, is designed to get around these problems. Since
however these possibilities are interesting and worth investigating in their own right we discuss
them in greater detail in Section 6.8
Figure 3 shows how the rejections line up against three survey-based measures of credit
conditions. We consider the responses of Italian banks participating to the euro area Bank
7The median number of applications per rm is one (in other words, less than half of the rms submit multiple
applications in any given month) and the distribution is highly skewed, with a standard deviation of 0.30 and a
maximum of 6.98 over the full period. The occurrence of multiple simultaneous applications by the same rm is
critical for identication: we discuss it further in section 4.
8A third evident fact in chart 2 is a strong seasonality in the data. In the econometric analysis we deal with
it via seasonal dummies or, more radically, rm-month xed e¤ects.
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Lending Survey (BLS) and two rm surveys conducted respectively by the Italian National
Statistical O¢ ce (ISTAT) and the Bank of Italy in cooperation with IlSole24Ore. We focus
on the 20082012 window only, for which all surveys are available. The series shows the net
percentage of respondents banks or rms, depending on the surveythat reported a perceived
tightening in credit conditions in any given quarter. The monthly rejection series is averaged at
the quarterly frequency to ease the comparison. Rejections track survey responses fairly well,
both in general and in topical moments such as 2008/9 and 2011, when credit conditions are
particularly tight. This illustrates why the Credit Register data is useful in isolating a credit
supply channel. The decision (not) to grant new loans is an important component of a banks
overall strategy, and a timely signal of changes in its lending policy, but it is necessarily neglected
when focusing only on observed variations in the outstanding stock of loans.
To study the timing of banksdecision we resort to a second binary variable, Postponedfbt.
This is created by (i) restricting the sample to the applications that were eventually approved, and
(ii) inspecting whether the corresponding loans were issued in the month following the request
(in which case the dummy is equal to zero) or with a delay of two or three months (dummy
equal to one). Since one month is the shortest horizon over which new loans can appear in the
data, the dummy sets aside all applications that were postponedrather than being approved
straightaway. The rationale behind this variables is simple: a rise in uncertainty could induce
banks to take more time before giving out a loan (besides rejecting more applicants), either
because they wait for new or better signals on the state of the economy or because they try
to collect more information on the quality of the applicant. This test is also useful from an
identication perspective. By restricting the analysis to successful applications only, we focus
on good borrowers and good projects, which limits concerns on changes in the composition
of applications over time. In other words, with this variable we e¤ectively rely on the banks
themselves (and on some hindsight) to get around the possibility that the pool of projects may
systematically worsen in bad times, which could lead to a spurious negative correlation between
the approval rate and uncertainty.
The applications are accepted on average after 1.4 months, with a standard deviation of 0.6
months. The timing of the approvals displays an interesting behavior at the aggregate level.
The share of postponed applications over total approvals is positively correlated with all our
uncertainty indicators. Some of them, including EPU, also have signicant predictive power
for this ratio. In the case of the EONIA rate, on the other hand, the correlation is weak and
predictability runs in the opposite direction (see table A1 in the annex for details). This provides
prima facie evidence that the timing of the approvals is inuenced specically by the level of
10
uncertainty in the economy.
4 Uncertainty and loan approvals
4.1 Is there a credit supply channel?
The primary objective of our analysis is to establish whether ceteris paribus banks reject more
loan applications when economic uncertainty is high. A second and closely related objective is to
test whether they also become less responsive to monetary policy: uctuations in interest rates
may matter less in highly uncertain environments. To this dual end, we estimate a set of models
where the dependent variable is a dummy Approvalfbt, which takes value 1 if the credit request
advanced by rm f in month t to bank b is approved within three months and zero otherwise (as
in Jiménez et al., 2014), the key regressor is the EPU uncertainty index by Baker et al. (2015),
and the potential inuence of uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy is captured by
an interaction between EPU and the EONIA rate.
Our loan-level data allows us to estimate regressions that include rm-specic xed e¤ects
that vary at the monthly frequency (Jimenéz et al. 2014). These present clear advantages in
terms of identication: the rm-month e¤ects capture all changes in business cycle conditions and
rm characteristics that may inuence the demand for credit, thus allowing a reliable estimate
of the impact of uncertainty on the supply side of the credit market. Conning the analysis to
such a set up, however, would be limiting: the relation between uncertainty and the average
approval rate (which is absorbed by the rm-month xed e¤ects) is interesting in its own right,
and the cross-sectional results are harder to interpret without some prior knowledge about this
average e¤ect. To fully exploit our data we thus proceed sequentially. We start from relatively
rudimentary regressions that only include macroeconomic and bank-specic controls and then
progressively move towards saturated specications that include rm-month xed e¤ects. An
important element of our identication strategy is to exploit heterogeneity in banks capital
bu¤ers as a proxy of their risk-bearing capacity and hence of their sensitivity to uncertainty. The
progression towards increasingly rich specications allows us to thoroughly test this mechanism
and check whether the role of capital changes when tightening the controls for credit demand.9
table 1 about here
9In Section 4.2 we study alternative specications that include both rm-month and bank-month xed e¤ects
to assess the inuence of uncertainty on the composition of credit.
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The estimates are displayed in Table 1. In the rst column loan approvals are regressed
exclusively on the EPU index, a set of macroeconomic and bank-specic control variables and
the rmscredit ratings. The macro controls include CPI ination, industrial production growth
and unemployment in Italy, all lagged one period. The bank controls are the Tier 1 capital ratio,
the liquidity ratio, and two dummies that identify respectively mutual banks (small-scale lenders
that mostly operate at a local level) and the ve largest banks in the sample (more complex and
diversied institution with a national or international dimension). Controlling for credit ratings
is important as a good rating may (and in fact turns out to) systematically improve an applicants
chance of being approved. These regressors are included in all subsequent specications. This
initial regression returns a negative and highly signicant EPU coe¢ cient, providing prima facie
evidence that the approval probability drops when uncertainty rises.10
In column 2 we introduce the EONIA rate, both in isolation and interacted with EPU,
leaving the rest of the specication unchanged. EPU retains its signicance. The negative and
signicant coe¢ cient of EONIA is in line with the extant literature on the bank lending channel,
that provides ample evidence that a tightening in monetary conditions leads to a decline in the
supply of credit. The interaction between EPU and EONIA is positive and highly signicant:
ceteris paribus, high uncertainty weakens the inuence of monetary policy on loan approvals.
This result demonstrates that, when faced with changes in economic conditions in uncertain
times, banks adopt a wait-and-see behavior analogous to that of nonnancial rms (Bloom,
2007, 2014). It also o¤ers one explanation why monetary policy might be relatively less e¤ective
when the economy is in recession and volatility is high (Tenreyro and Twhaites, 2016). The
estimates suggests that the impact of uncertainty on loan approvals is quantitatively in the same
ballpark as that associated to monetary policy itself. To put the estimates in context, note that
the EONIA rate is expressed in decimal points while EPU is normalized to 1 in 2000 and has a
standard deviation of 0.53. Given this scaling, the coe¢ cients in column 2 imply that, starting
from the current zero lower boundon interest rates, a 100 basis points rise in EONIA would
lower the approval probability by 1.1% and a one standard deviation increase in EPU would
lower it by 2.1%.
The next step is to bring bank capital into the picture. The inuence of uncertainty should
be stronger for banks that have low capital bu¤ers and hence less capacity for holding aggregate
risk. We investigate this possibility by interacting the banks Tier 1 capital ratio with the
EPU terms. Since capital is known to matter for the transmission of monetary policy too, we
10Errors are clustered at the bank*month level troughout the paper, following Jimenez et al. (2012). When we
saturate the model with bank*month and rm*month xed e¤ects we restort to a triple cluster (bank, rm and
month). In general, results are robust to alternative clustering, including by month and by bank and month.
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also include its interaction with EONIA.11 The test is performed in three alternative set-ups: in
column 3 we simply add the capital-based interactions to the specication of column 2; in column
4 we augment the regression with bank and rm xed e¤ects; and in column 5 we saturate it
with a full set of rm-month xed e¤ects. The upshot from this exercise is that capital has a
powerful dampening e¤ect for uncertainty shocks. This mechanism involves both the direct and
the indirect e¤ect of uncertaunty: higher capital makes banks both less responsive to variations
in EPU and less prone to adopting a wait-and-see type of behavior. These patterns appear
consistently across specications 3 to 5. Column 5 is of course of particular interest. Owing to
the presence of rm-month xed e¤ects, a confusion between demand and supply channels is in
this case extremely unlikely. The level e¤ects of EPU and EONIA are absorbed by the xed
e¤ects and the sample size drops by an order of 10 because the estimation relies exclusively on
rms that apply to more than one bank in any given month. In practice this model checks how
the propensity to approve applications coming from the same rm in the same month changes
across banks depending on their capital ratios. Conditional on a rise in uncertainty, the approval
rate drops signicantly less for highly capitalized banks. The coe¢ cients in column 5 can be used
to quantify the importance of capital. The median capital ratio in our sample is 8.7%. Relative to
that benchmark, a one standard deviation rise in EPU causes the approval probability to drop 0.3
percentage points more for banks with a 6.1% capital ratio (the lowest decile of the distribution)
and 0.7 percentage points less for banks with 15.5% capital ratio (the highest decile). Note that
both the average e¤ects of EPU and EONIA (columns 1 to 4) and the dampening role of capital
(columns 3 to 5) turn out to be very robust across models.
In table 2 we replicate the analysis using alternative indicators of economic uncertainty. In
panel (a) the European EPU index is replaced rst by VSTOXX (columns 1 to 4) and then by
the Italian EPU (columns 5 to 8). In panel (b) we use forecastersdisagreement on CPI ination
(columns 1 to 4) and the public budget balance of the euro area (columns 5 to 8). For each of
the indicators we estimate the same models used in Table 1, replicating the progression from a
specication with bank and macroeconomic controls to a fully saturated regression with rm-
month xed e¤ects. The key results of our analysis are remarkably robust. In all combinations
of proxies and specications we estimate a negative coe¢ cient for uncertainty and a positive
coe¢ cient for the interaction between uncertainty and EONIA. In the saturated regressions,
the dampening e¤ect of bank capital appears for three indicators out of four, the exception
being VSTOXX. This suggests that measurement problems are extremely unlikely to constitute
11As we noted above the capital ratio is included as a control variable in all regressions of table 1. Not
surprisingly its coe¢ cient is positive and signicant in most cases, suggesting that well-capitalized banks are on
average more willing to accept new customers.
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a rst-order problem in our analysis (we discuss measurement problem more in section 6).
table 2 about here
Another important concern is the stability of the estimates over time. Economic conditions
changed signicantly between 2003 and 2012, as the Italian economy transitioned from a relatively
calm phase, with constant or rising interest rates, to two crisis episodes the global nancial crisis
of 2008-2009 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis  that were accompanied by signicant
monetary expansions. To check how the transmission of uncertainty changed in these periods
we re-estimate the saturated specication in column 5 of table 1 separately for each year of
the sample. The estimated coe¢ cients are displayed in gure 4. The gure reports the point
estimate and a 90% condence interval for each of the three interactions involving bank capital.
The estimates are generally larger and less accurate in the second half of the sample, but the signs
of the coe¢ cients are extremely robust. In particular, the interaction between capital and EPU
always enters the regression with a positive coe¢ cient except in 2005, when it is approximately
zero. The signicance levels of the estimates are also surprisingly high considering that each of
these year-specic regressions only relies on 12 observations on EPU and on an overall sample
size of approximately 250,000 observations due to the xed e¤ect saturation.
In Section 6 we examine the robustness of the results in table 1 along various other dimensions
and discuss a range of microeconomic phenomena that might in principle interfere with our
identication strategy, including changes in the quality and composition of the applications or in
their distribution across banks. In the remainder of this section we investigate instead how the
transmission of uncertainty changes depending on banksliquidity, size and business model. Like
capital, liquidity might in principle dampen banksreaction to aggregate uncertainty. Liquidity
is unlikely to directly a¤ect a banks attitude towards credit risk, but it might for instance
increase its tolerance for maturity risk, making it more willing to commit its funds for longer
time periods. Bankssize and business models are also likely to play some role, as small local
lenders and international players are unlikely to deal with uncertainty (or even perceive it) in
the same way. To explore these possibilities, in table 3 we re-estimate the regressions interacting
uncertainty with liquidity, size or business model indicators instead of the bankscapital ratios.
The exercise is performed for both the regression based on bank and rm xed e¤ects (where
EPU and EONIA appear independently) and the saturated specication with rm-month xed
e¤ects (where they only appear through their interaction with the relevant bank indicator).
table 3 about here
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We nd that liquidity plays a role in dampening the transmission of both monetary policy
and uncertainty. Interestingly, in the latter case liquidity works mainly by reducing banks
inaction region: this implies that liquid banks respond less on average to monetary shocks, as
demonstrated by the bank lending channel literature, but their response is also more stable, i.e.
less dependent on the prevailing level of uncertainty. While large intermediaries do no appear to
behave di¤erently from the average bank, mutual banks display a lower-than-average sensitivity
to uncertainty (column 6). This may indicate that they are less informed, or that their business
model leads them to pay less attention to the aggregate, economy-wide risks captured by the
EPU index.12 In section 4.2 we explore heterogeneity across applicants in order to discriminate
between these mechanisms.
4.2 The composition e¤ects of uncertainty
Our loan-level dataset makes it possible to push the saturation of the model one step further
and introduce bankmonth xed e¤ects alongside the firmmonth e¤ects used in the previous
section. A similar exercise is proposed in a di¤erent context by Jimenez et al. (2012, 2014). In
this set up the interaction between uncertainty and bank capital is also absorbed by the xed
e¤ects and the analysis must focus on triple interaction terms where uncertainty is combined with
both bank and rm characteristics. This specication follows a di¤erent logic than those pursued
in Section 4.1. In this case the objective is not to rene the identication of the supply-side e¤ects
of uncertainty, but rather to draw a more detailed picture of its compositional implications: which
bank-rm relations are most a¤ected by uncertainty? And what are the features of the marginal
borrowersthat get rejected in uncertain times?
Table 4 reports the results of a range of fully saturated specications that include both
bank- and rm-level monthly xed e¤ects. For each specication we report the estimated coe¢ -
cients for the triple interactions between EONIA or EPU and some combination of bank and rm
characteristics. The specications only di¤er because of these combinations. On the bank side,
following the analysis in the previous section we consider the capital ratio (panel (a), columns 1
to 3), the liquidity ratio (panel a, columns 4 to 6) and two dummies that identify mutual banks
(panel b, columns 1 to 3) and the ve largest banks in our sample (panel b, columns 4-6). On
the rm side, we condition on the new potential borrowers being large (assets above the 90th
percentile of the distribution), having a good credit rating (Altmans et. al. (1994) z-score below
3, where 1 is assigned to the best borrower and 9 to the worst ones) or being headquartered in the
12Mutual banks appear less sensitive even if we use the Italian EPU index instead of the European one, dispelling
any concerns that the latter might simply measure uncertainty at the wrong geographical level (the results are
available upon request).
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same province as the bank they apply to. Since in these models the estimation relies exclusively
on banks and rms that engage in multiple relation at any given point in time, the size of the
sample drops considerably relative to Table 1.13
table 4 about here
The dampening role of bank capital emerges again consistently in columns 1 and 3 of panel
a. This provides an important validation of the results discussed in Section 4.1. Although they
do not change the basic message, these estimates show that capital remains important for the
transmission of uncertainty even if one controls for the observed and unobserved factors that
a¤ect the average behavior of each bank at a given point in time. Notably, such factors include
the banks(time-varying and potentially idiosyncratic) views on both the path of future economic
activity and the real state of their balance sheets, which are unlikely to be captured by balance
sheet data.
Liquidity reduces the transmission of uncertainty to local borrowers (on which see below) but
not to large rms. Highly liquid banks are in fact less likely to accept these as new customers
when uncertainty is high, possibly on account of a bad match between their own preferences
for holding liquid securities and the clientsneeds (large loans attached to complex investment
projects). The comparison between mutual banks and large banks is also informative. These
banks behave roughly in the same way when dealing with large or highly rated rms. The only
factor that really sets them apart is their attitude towards local rms: mutual banks have much
higher approval rates for rms that are located in their own province (panel b, column 3), whereas
geographical proximity is completely irrelevant for large banks (column 6). The emergence of a
positive role for physical proximity is coherent with the literature on distance, monitoring and
credit supply (see Degryse et al. 2007 for a survey). In our case, the ndings shed some light
on the reasons why small lenders are less responsive to uncertainty. Given that their approval
rates drop for the average borrower more than the local ones, their behavior cannot be driven by
lack of information on the state of the economy. The discrimination suggests instead that local
borrowers are preferable from their perspective when uncertainty is high, either because gathering
information about them is easier or less costly or because their projects have a high alphabut a
low beta(i.e. they carry signicant idiosyncratic risk but are less correlated with the aggregate
risks captured by the EPU indicator). What is also interesting, and perhaps somewhat puzzling,
is that distance matters more than rmscredit ratings: in table 4 the same provincedummy is
13Errors are here clustered at the bank, rm and month level, following Jimenez et al. (2014). Note that the
number of observation changes across columns because it also depends on the availability of bank-level data.
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positive in three cases out of four (when interacted with capital, liquidity, and the mutual bank
status) while the rating dummy is never signicant. From a rms perspective, geographical
proximity is thus a far better hedge against uncertainty shocks than a sound credit record.
5 Uncertainty and the timing of loan approvals
Uncertainty could also a¤ect the timing of the approvals: obtaining a loan may take longer when
uncertainty is high. To test this proposition we separate rmsapplications depending on how
quickly they got approved and then check if the likelihood of a longer approval process rises
systematically after an increase in uncertainty. More specically, we restrict the analysis to the
subsample of applications that were ultimately successful (i.e. those for which Approvalfbt = 1),
and dene in this set a dummy Postponedfbt that takes value zero for the applications that were
approved within a month following the submission and value one for those that were instead
postponedand incurred a delay of one month or more.14 Besides being interesting in its own
right, this variable is valuable from an identication perspective. In some of the regressions
examined in Section 4.1, failure to fully capture banksexpectations on the economy might mean
that bad news (that are typically associated with a rise in EPU) may bias our estimate of the
uncertainty coe¢ cient.15 This should be less of an issue with Postponedfbt because the natural
response to outright bad news is to reject more applications, not to postpone the decisions.
More importantly, by restricting the analysis to successful applicants we focus on good projects
only and hence limit any concerns one might have on how the composition of the applications
changes over time. This variable e¤ectively allows us to rely on the banks themselves to rule out
the possibility that the pool of projects in the estimation sample worsens in bad times, leading
spuriously associate drops in the approval rate to uncertainty.16
table 6 here
A set of loan-level regressions of Postponedfbt on EPU are reported in Table 5. Since we
have no priors on whether the timing of banksdecisions should respond to the level or to the
14In principle one could estimate a multivariate logit model including all approval dates (t + 1, t + 2, t + 3)
as alternative outcomes. Since however our objective is to test the null hypothesis that uncertainty does not
inuence the approval timing at all, a linear model based on a binary dummy is valid and simpler alternative to
it.
15We emphasize however that this problem cannot arise in the models of Section 4.2, where the bank-month
xed e¤ects also capture banks(potentially heterogeneous) expectations on the macroeconomic outlook.
16The saturated regressions in Section 4 already control for changes in the composition of the pool of rms
via rm-month e¤ects. Here we go one step further and try to x selection problems at the level of projects (i.e.
applications) too.
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variation in uncertainty we provide results based on both specications. We again build up the
specications going progressively from plain OLS regressions (columns 1 and 4) to regressions
that include bank and rm xed e¤ects (columns 3 and 6), including in all cases the usual set
of controls. The coe¢ cient is positive and signicant across specications, implying that the
likelihood of an application being postponed increases systematically when uncertainty is high
or on the rise. Interestingly, Postponedfbt is not correlated to levels and changes in the EONIA
rate (see table A2 in the annex). Given that EONIA contains information on the current and
expected state of the economy, but not on the uncertainty that surrounds them, its lack of
signicance conrms that these regressions isolate a genuine uncertainty e¤ect. The delays are
associated with the banksdi¢ culty in forming forecasts on the future path of the economy rather
than with (downward) revisions in those forecasts.
Additional regressions reported in the annex to the paper conrm that this relation is robust
across uncertainty indicators (tables A3), and show that it varies across rm (but not bank)
characteristics (table A4). In particular, rms that are located close to the bank to which they
place the application face a probability of being postponed that is low on average but rises
relatively more in response to an increase in uncertainty. Combined with the results of section
4.2, this suggests that, although proximity is a good hedge against uncertainty-driven rejections,
local applicants are kept on hold for longer when uncertainty rises, possibly because banks exploit
some degree of informational hold-up power on close-by rm (Diamond, 1991). A similar pattern
emerges indeed for rms that are below the 90th percentile of the total asset distribution.
6 Discussion
In this section we examine briey a range of additional robustness tests and then discuss alterna-
tive mechanisms that might in principle give place to the patterns we observe in our data. The
estimates of the level e¤ect of uncertainty on the average approval rate displayed in column 2 of
table 1 keep their sign and signicance when including bank and rm xed e¤ects, irrespective
of how uncertainty is measured (see table A5 and A6 in the annex). Since EONIA and our
main uncertainty proxies are dened at the European level, and are consequently not driven by
economic conditions in Italy, endogeneity with respect to the Italian business cycle is unlikely
to be a serious problem. At any rate, using lags of these variables in the regression, either in
combination with or instead of their contemporaneous values, leaves the estimates essentially
unchanged (table A5, columns 1 and 2).
Another set of problems relates to measurement, at both the macroeconomic and microeco-
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nomic level. To check the potential mismeasurement of monetary policy we replace EONIA with
the one-month EURIBOR rate (table A7, column 3). Since EPU might conceivably pick up
the e¤ect of plain bad news about the future of the economy, as well as genuine uncertainty,
we also add to the regression two survey-based measures of expectations. In particular, we
use the Economic Sentiment Indicator for Italy (a broad indicator that combines consumer and
rm information) and a measure of Italian rmsexpectations on production, employment and
selling prices over the following 12 months constructed using the surveys run by the European
Commission. The results are again in line with the baseline (table A7, column 4). The EPU
coe¢ cients are actually larger than those estimated in our baseline regression, suggesting that
the uncertainty indicator is not inated by the occurrence of bad news.17
Measurement issues may also involve the loan application data. The reporting threshold in
the Credit Register was lowered in 2009 from 75,000 to 30,000 euros, resulting in an increase in
the number of loans traceable in the records. This change is of course irrelevant for the regressions
that include rm*month xed e¤ects, or are estimated separately year by year (see Section 4.1),
but it must be dealt with in all other cases. To bypass the break, in our analysis we consider
only loans above 75,000 euros throughout the sample (as in Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette, 2012).
As a further robustness we estimate the model using only large rms (those with assets above
90th percentile of the distribution), which are virtually una¤ected by the change, or relying on
the raw, unadjusted data. Our main conclusion hold in both cases (see table A7, columns 5
and 6). During the period we consider the banking sector underwent a number of mergers and
acquisitions. In principle M&As should not a¤ect our dependent variable, as this only covers new
requests for credit. However, when assessing the existing credit relations of the acquired bank(s),
the acquirer might possibly place for convenience queries to the Credit Register which appear as
new applications in the data. If M&A activity were to concentrate in periods of low uncertainty,
this could create a negative correlation between uncertainty and the probability of approval. For
this reason in our baseline analysis we exclude from the sample all queries advanced by newly
formed groups in the year when the M&A takes place. Including these observations, however,
does not a¤ect the results (table A7, column 7). Finally, the applications display strong seasonal
patterns, with regular falls in August and December (see Figure 2). To account for this, we
include in the model a full set of month dummies: the impact on the coe¢ cients of interest is
again negligible (table A7, column 8).
Going beyond robustness, the credibility of our results can also be scrutinized from a broader
17In table A8 we present the result of the two robustness tests that we can carry out on the specication with
the interaction with capital (columns 4 and 5 table 1), i.e. swapping the coe¢ cients with their lagged values and
substituing EONIA with euribor. Results are robust.
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economic perspective. Our ndings could in principle also be explained by changes in the com-
position of the applicants over time: if the pool of applicants deteriorates during downturns,
we might wrongly link to uncertainty an increase in the rejection rate that depends instead on
the declining quality of the borrowers. Surprisingly, though, the borrowers do not get worse in
recessions. In Figure 5 we plot the average credit rating of the applicants over time. Lower
numbers are associated to better borrowers, with 1 representing the highest credit quality. The
chart shows that the average rating improves after Lehman, suggesting a self-selection process
on the rmsside that should -if anything- run against our results. Another interesting fact is
that this qualitative improvement is even more visible in the case of successful (i.e. approved)
borrowers: the average ratings of applicants and successful applicants overlap in the rst half of
the sample but a clear gap opens up between them after 2008, indicating a stronger selection
on the banksside too. This might of course represent yet another adjustment of the lenders
to a riskier environment. In any case, these dynamics are fully controlled for at the rm level
by the rm-month xed e¤ects. Furthermore, our analysis of the timing of banksdecisions in
Section 5 is not a¤ected by credit quality concerns even at the project level, as it focuses only
on applications that are eventually approved by the banks.
Another possibility is that our results are partly driven by a congestionproblem. If they
systematically get more applications in bad times, banks could become more willing to reject
marginal applicants and slower at processing the applications, leading at once to an increase
in rejections and a lenghtening of the waiting time for successful rms. In aggregate terms, the
number of applications generally declines rather than increasing in the highly uncertain years that
follow the Lehman crisis (see Figure 1 and 2). There are however episodes when the applications
do increase for instance in the middle of the 2009 recession and in any case the aggregate
pattern might mask heterogeneity in their distribution across banks. To shed more light on this
possibility we look at the average number of application received per month by di¤erent bank
categories. This is roughly constant for all bank categories, with the exception of a short-lived
increase in the applications submitted to largebanks in the rst half of 2011 (see gure A1 in
the annex). Re-estimating our Postpone regression without these observations leaves the results
una¤ected, conrming that the congestion explanation can be safely ruled out (the results are
available upon request).
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7 Conclusions
Credit systematically dries up when the future is uncertain. The theory suggests that this
phenomenon might reect both demand dynamics uncertain rms are more likely to postpone
their investment decisions and supply-side e¤ects, as lenders are less willing to nance new
projects when their returns become more volatile. In this article we exploit condential loan-
level data from the Italian Credit Register to test the existence and the scope of the second
transmission mechanism. We study the outcome of loan applications submitted to Italian banks
by a large sample of rms between 2003 and 2012. To isolate the impact of uncertainty on
the supply of credit we exploit the occurrence of multiple bank-rm relations and compare the
outcomes of applications placed in the same time period by the same rm to banks that have
di¤erent capital bu¤ers, and hence a di¤erent propensity to hold aggregate risk.
Our conclusion is that the credit market is all but a sideshow to the propagation of uncertainty
shocks. We obtain three main results. First, a rise in aggregate uncertainty lowers the likelihood
that rmsapplications will be successful, reducing the supply of new credit. Second, uncertainty
delays the ow of funds to the economy: even successful applicants must wait longer for their
loans to be issued when uncertainty is high. Third, uncertainty interferes with the bank lending
channel of monetary policy. When uncertainty is high banks become less sensitive to changes in
interest rates, displaying a wait-and-see behavior that is entirely analogous to that traditionally
documented for nonnancial rms. Uncertainty matters relatively more for thinly capitalized
banks, as predicted by the theory, and it is more likely to a¤ect rms that are geographically
distant from the bank to which they apply.
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Figures
Figure 1. Uncertainty indicators over time
Note: Note: VSTOXX (left scale) is the monthly average of the daily VSTOXX stock price option-implied
volatility index. EPU (right scale) is the Economic Policy Uncertainty indicators constructed by Baker et al.
(2015) using the frequency of uncertainty-related keywords occurring in a set of European and Italian daily
newspapers. Sources: Datastream and www.policyuncertainty.com.
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Figure 2. Loan applications
Note: The blue line shows the total number of loan applications placed by rms (left scale). The red line shows
the average number of applications placed by rms who submitted at least one application (right scale). Grey
bars identify the recessions dated by the OECD. The sample period is August 2003 December 2012. Source:
Italian Credit Register and authorscalculations.
27
Figure 3. A comparison between rejections and survey responses
Note: The lines shows the quarterly mean of applications placed against a number of survey indicators of credit
supply conditions in Italy. The black line is the net percentage of the responses of Italian banks participating
in the euro area bank lending survey that indicate a tightening in credit standards and those indicating a
loosening, compared with the previous quarter (increases indicate that credit supply have been tightened).
The blue line is the net percentage of rms surveyed in the Bank of Italy-Il Sole24Ore survey that indicate
to have perceived a restiction in credit supply. This is conducted quarterly on a sample of medium-sized and
large rms (with at least 50 employees) in industry (excluding construction) and services. The dotted line is
ditto for the Istat business condence surveys are conducted on samples of manufacturing and service rms
(excluding retail and wholesale trade) and construction companies. Source: Italian CredRegister, ISTAT, Bank
Lending survey and authorscalculation.
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Figure 4. Parameter stability.
Note: The chart present the resutl of a robustness test assessing the stability
of the ndings acroos the sample period. The panels report the point
estimates and a 90% condence interval for each of the three interaction terms.
Estimation is based on a regression model where the dependent variable is
the loan approval probability and the controls include the interaction between
bank capital and EONIA, the interaction between bank capital and the EPU
index, a triple interaction between capital, EONIA and EPU and a full set of
rm-month xed e¤ects (see table 1, column 5). The regression is estimated
separately for each year between 2004 and 2012.
29
Figure 5. Number and credit quality of the applicants.
Note: Green bars indicate the number of rms that submitted loan applications in any given month (left axis).
The red dashed line shows the average credit rating of the applicants (right axis) and the black continuous
line shows the average credit rating of those whose applications were approved (right axis). Credit ratings are
calculated by Cerved and range from 1 to 9, with 1 denoting the best rms. Source: Bank of Italy Credit
Register and authorscalculations
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Tables
Table 1. The impact of uncertainty on loan approval
approval
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EPU EU -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.061*** -0.062***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
eonia -1.133** -1.483* -2.609***
(0.486) (0.816) (0.427)
EPU EU*eonia 1.753*** 2.713*** 2.820***
(0.329) (0.578) (0.361)
capital*EPU 0.002** 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
capital*eonia 0.019 0.102*** 0.114**
(0.049) (0.034) (0.055)
capital*EPU*eonia -0.078** -0.069*** -0.067*
(0.035) (0.026) (0.038)
bank controls yes yes yes yes yes
rm rating yes yes yes yes -
macro controls yes yes yes yes -
bank FE no no no yes yes
rm FE no no no yes -
rm*month FE no no no no yes
observations 2259892 2259892 2259892 2078492 260390
estimation OLS OLS panel FE panel FE panel FE
Note: these regressions examine the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on the probability that an
application is approved, considering the transmission via bank capital. The dependent variable
is approval, taking value 1 if the loan application is approved. EPU EU is the monthly value
of Baker et al. (2015) measure for policy uncertainty index for Europe. capital is the banking
groups risk weighted assets to total assets (capital ratio) lagged by one quarter. bank controls
are the banks liquidity ratio, a dummy for the ve largest banking groups and a dummy for
mutual banks. macro controls are the unemployment rate, the ination rate and the industrial
production rate for Italy, lagged by one quarter. Some covariates included in the model are not
reported to imprve clarity. Sample period is 2003:08 to 2012:12. Errors are clustered at the bank
group*month level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5. The impact of uncertainty on postponed applications.
postponed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPU 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.024**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.011)
EPU 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
bank controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
rm rating yes yes - yes yes -
macro controls yes yes - yes yes -
bank FE no no yes no no yes
rm FE no yes - no yes -
rm*year FE no no yes no no yes
observations 399024 240944 78424 393691 236469 77699
estimation OLS panel FE panel FE OLS panel FE panel FE
Note: these regressions examine the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on the probability that
the decision on an application that is eventually approved is postponed to the next one or two
month. The dependent variable is postponed, taking value 1 if the loan application is approved in
the month(s) following the rst one after reception. EPU is the monthly value of Bakers policy
uncertainty index for Europe (3-month delta and levels). Sample period is 2003:08 to 2012:12.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the bank group*month level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Annex
A. Data description
Monthly data on loan applications are corrected for mergers and acquisition by discarding the
applications advanced to the acquiring bank by costumers of the acquired bank in the quarter
before the completion of the M&A. To account for the change in reporting threshold (January
2009) we consider only the applications that were not a¤ected by it. Both correction are relaxed
in the robustness tests in section 6 Other features of loan applications and uncertainty indicators
are discussed in Section 3 of the paper.
To these data we merge bank balance sheet information drawn from the Bank of Italy su-
pervisory records. We use consolidated quarterly series on banksTier 1 capital ratio, liquidity
ratio (dened as the ratio of cash and securities to total assets), a dummy to single out banks
belonging to the ve largest groups and one for mutual banks. Information on rms comes
from the proprietary database managed by Cerved Group R, from which we initially randomly
selected the rms in our data. The dataset gives us yearly information on total assets and the
Cerved R rating, a synthetic indicator of the rms overall credit quality.18 We also separately
collect information on the distance between the rmsheadquarters and the o¢ ces of the banks
that receive their credit applications.
Our baseline monetary policy indicator is the monthly average of daily EONIA rates, as in
Jiménez et al. (2014). Using EONIA has two important advantages. The rst one is that EONIA
might capture at least in part the impact of unconventional monetary interventions that we do not
account for explicitly in the regressions (Ciccarelli et al., 2015). The second one is that, given its
short (overnight) maturity, EONIA is relatively less a¤ected by liquidity and credit risk premia.
This point is clearly critical for our purposes: using interest rates that are heavily driven by
agentsrisk perceptions would greatly complicate our attempts to disentangle uncertainty e¤ects
from the ordinary bank lending channel of monetary policy. In the robustness analysis we use a
one-month Euribor rate, though this is less attractive because it might have been partly driven
by risk-related concerns, particularly after 2007 (Angelini et al. 2011). Our main macroeconomic
control variables are the monthly series on ination, industrial production and the unemployment
rate in Italy available from the European Central Banks Statistical Data Warehouse. Ination
is the quarterly growth rate in the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) that excludes
food and energy (a proxy of coreination). Since GDP is not available on a monthly basis, we
measure economic activity with the quarterly growth in industrial production and unemployment.
In addition to these, in the robustness analysis we use two measure of expectations on future
economic activity constructed with survey data from the European Commission. The rst one
is the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), a broad sentiment measure published directly by
the European Commission which includes household and rm expectations and perceptions on
the current state of the economy. The second one is an expected activity indicator that we
construct by averaging rmsexpectations on their own production levels, employment and selling
prices over the following 12 months.
18Cerved computes a z-score (rating) based on the methodology developed in Altman (1994) to all rms that
present a balance sheet su¢ ciently detailed to compute the indicator.
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The variables in the data are organized in such a way to reproduce the information set avail-
able to the evaluating bank in the month when the application is formulated. More precisely,
data on the monetary policy rate and on uncertainty are contemporaneous; the other macroeco-
nomic variables and information on banks refer to the quarter preceding the loan application;
and the rm-level variables refer to the end of the previous year.
B. Figures
Figure A1. Number of applications per bank category.
Note: The red line displays the average number of application received in a certain month by mutual banks.
The blue line ditto for banks belonging to one of the top ve banking groups. The black dotted link is the
average applications per banks in the sample.
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C. Additional tables
Table A2. Postponed applications: robustness tests.
posponed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EPU 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
eonia -0.258 -0.600 0.072
(0.403) (0.458) (1.590)
EPU 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
eonia -2.510 -1.966 -1.396
(3.232) (2.692) (2.879)
bank controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
rm rating yes yes - yes yes -
macro controls yes yes - yes yes -
bank FE no no yes no no yes
rm FE no yes - no yes -
rm*year FE no no yes no no yes
observations 399024 240944 78424 393691 236469 77699
estimation OLS panel FE panel FE OLS panel FE panel FE
Note: these regressions examine the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on the probability that the
decision on an application that is eventually approved is postponed to the next one or two month. The
dependent variable is postponed, taking value 1 if the loan application is approved in the month(s)
following the rst one after reception. EPU is the monthly value of Bakers policy uncertainty index
for Europe (3-month delta and levels). Sample period is 2003:08 to 2012:12. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.Errors are clustered at the bank group*month level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4. Postponed applications: heterogeneity across banks.
postponed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EPU 0.027** 0.045*** 0.024*** 0.066***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.007) (0.020)
x -0.001 0.001 -0.039*** -0.105***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.022)
EPU*x 0.000 -0.001 0.029*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.019)
x is
capital
ratio
liquidity
ratio
same
province
small
rms
bank controls yes yes yes yes
rm rating yes yes yes yes
macro controls yes yes yes yes
bank FE yes yes yes yes
rm FE yes yes yes yes
observations 240944 240944 235456 191849
estimation panel FE panel FE panel FE panel FE
Note: these regressions examine heterogeneity across bank characteristics of the e¤ect of
an increase in uncertainty on the probability that the decision on an application that is
eventually approved is postponed to the next one or two months. The dependent variable
is postponed, taking value 1 if the loan application is approved in the month(s) following
the rst one after reception. EPU is the monthly value of Bakers policy uncertainty
index for Europe (3-month delta and levels). bank controls as dened in the table and
described in table 4. Sample period is 2003:08 to 2012:12. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Errors are clustered at the bank group*month level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5. The impact of uncertainty on loan approvals: robustness to xed e¤ects.
approval
(1) (2) (3)
EPU EU -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.056***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
eonia -1.133** -0.759*** -1.617***
(0.486) (0.281) (0.272)
EPU EU*eonia 1.753*** 1.623*** 2.151***
(0.329) (0.235) (0.220)
bank controls yes yes yes
rm rating yes yes yes
macro controls yes yes yes
bank FE no yes yes
rm FE no no yes
observations 2259892 2259883 2078492
estimation OLS panel FE panel FE
Note: these regressions examine the e¤ect of an increase in uncertainty on the probability that an
application is approved. The dependent variable is approval, taking value 1 if the loan application
is approved. EPU is the monthly value of Bakers policy uncertainty index for Europe. Sample
period is 2003:08 to 2012:12. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the
bank group* month level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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